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RESPONSE TO DAVIS'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Davis has made allegations in his Statement of the Case and Statement of 
Facts, that are not pi operly cited to the R ecord whicl i contaii i. arg m i lei it 01 tl icy are 
totally irrelevant to this proceeding, to which Hatch responds as follows: 
1. Hatch objects to Davis's Statement of Case No. 10. This assertion is not 
cited to the Record. Hatch did attempt to take the deposition of Davis's expert and 
scheduled her deposition pursuant to the ti I a. 1 ecu irt's instr i lctioi I at tl le Pre- I 'rial 
Conference; however, Davis's expert failed to appear. (Rec. 672-674; 688-695). 
2. Hatch objects to No. 12. A transcript of the all the relevant evidence 
offered in support of the finding of infliction of emotional distress has been provided, 
pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of i appellate Procedure I latcl I is not required to 
provide a transcript of legal arguments. The 11 trial witnesses identified by Davis 
testified regarding the assault and battery on February 1, 1996. Hatch is not appealing 
or challenging the trial court's finding that there was probable cause and issues of fact 
as to the assault and battery claim; and Dav is has not appealed tl le trial court's decision 
on this issue. Hatch contends, after the trial court found probable cause and issues of fact 
on this issue; both the Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process claims should have 
been dismissed. The trial court erred in submitting probable cause issue to the jury. 
3. . In response to No 15 1 latcl I s coin lsel did i aise ai I issue with the language 
in the jury instruction regarding "harassment" and the proper language that should be 
included, sufficient to raise the issue on appeal. Hatch's counsel clearly states that 
harassment is not an abuse. (Rec. 1194, p. 716). 
4. In response to No. 16, Hatch did raise his First Amendment rights and his 
right to criticize public officials in his Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. 311-312), 
in his Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence at Trial (Rec. 656), as well as, after trial 
(Rec. 1194, pp. 717-720). 
5. In response to 17 & 18, Davis fails to cite any law that requires a party to 
request on the record that the jury be advised when a cause of action has been dismissed. 
The jury should have been advised of this. The verdict form contained the assault and 
battery claim first, but in such a way as to require the jury to find an abuse of process, if 
it doesn't find in favor of Hatch on his assault and battery claim. 
6. In response to No. 19. The reason the award was reduced was because the 
jury, not acting upon any evidence but mere prejudice found $75,000.00 in attorneys 
fees, when this issue was ever presented to the jury, and no evidence of such an amount. 
7. In response to No. 16. The Judgment entered was a "Partial Judgment," 
stating that, "it does not resolve all issues raised between the parties, and the time for 
appeal shall not commence to run until a final judgment is entered that fully concludes 
the litigation." (Rec. 796). 
8. The trail court requested additional information regarding the Abuse of 
Process claim after the jury trial. Hatch submitted additional information and a letter, 
dated April 15, 2002, which included the case Arnica Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 
768 P.2d 950, 959 (Ut.App. 1989) and objected to any treatment of Davis's claim as an 
abuse of civil process, arguing that 2 elements are necessary for such a claim (1) ulterior 
motive and (2) a willful act in use of the process not proper in the regular course of the 
proceedings, citing, Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce, 988 P„?d I B (Az.App. 1999) and 
Executive Mgt. Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 963 P.2d 464 (N.M. 1998). (See letter, dated 
April 15, 2002, attached in the Addendum, as Ex. A). 
9. In response to No. 25. Hatch testified at trial, that although there was a 
deed recorded on the Brook's Subdivision property , 1 le did not ow i i the property. Hatch 
was paying for the property and set up a legal Trust with Mitchell as beneficiary, in case 
he was unable to fully pay her. (Rec. 1194, pp. 693-694). This Order was not entered 
with the concurrence of all the parties. Hatch's counsel in fact filed a Motion to Vacate 
the Order Precluding the I rai lsfei of Enci ii i ibrai ice of Pi oper ty , i aising the same issues 
raised on appeal. (Rec. 813-815) Furthermore, a letter was sent to the trial court and 
Davis's counsel, regarding the need of personal service on Mr. Hatch. (See letter, dated 
April 18, 2002, attached in the Addendum, as Ex. B). 
10. 1 latch objects to No 26 I "he Bai lki uptc> Pleadii igs are not 'part of tl le 
Record on appeal, and have not been designated as such. Any reference to the 
Bankruptcy Proceeding should be stricken by this Court, and are not properly before the 
Court to be considered on appeal. The deed on the property was not filed by Hatch, but 
by Mitchell to secure hei interest m the property. The deed WAS duted fwo years 
previously, in January 2000. 
11. Hatch objects to Nos. 27 & 28. This information is solely offered for 
_ i _ 
prejudicial reasons and has nothing to do with the issues appealed by Hatch in this case. 
(Davis did not appeal any issues in the case). The Bankruptcy filing was necessary as 
Hatch could not obtain a stay in the case. There was no finding of any fraud or bad-faith 
in the Bankruptcy proceeding, although vehemently argued for by Davis. The 
proceeding was not dismissed because of any fraud or post-verdict transfers, but because 
the schedules were not complete. The dismissal was without prejudice, and can be re-
filed, with complete schedules. (See Order of Dismissal, Addendum, Ex. C). 
12. In response to Statement of Fact No. 3, the term, "long time girl friend" is 
not in the record, and should be stricken. 
13. In response to No. 4, there is no evidence that Hatch became "obsessed" 
with Davis. Hatch had concerns about the Park and voiced his legitimate concerns to 
Davis and his supervisors, at Davis's request. (Rec. 1193, pp. 253, 270, 273). 
14. In response to No. 5, there is no evidence that Hatch made trips to Cedar 
City or Salt Lake City 6 times to personally met with Davis's supervisors. 
15. In response to No. 6, there were 17 letters sent over a four period, before 
the 4 year statutory time period. The last letter was in 1993. These letters do not contain 
any threats against Davis, but question his ability to operate the Park. (See Hatch's 
Statement of Facts Nos. 5-24). 
16. In response to No 7, Davis failed to prove at trial, and has failed to cite to 
the Record, where he established that the issues raised by Hatch were false. 
17. In response to No. 8, Davis claims that Hatch is hiding behind "political 
. 4 . 
issues" while it is Davis who asserts in his Counterclaim that Hatch is trying to coerce 
Davis to comply with Hatch's political views. (Rec. 6 & 62). 
18. In response to No. 9, Davis can still only maintain that he had to respond 
to Hatch's inquiries and had some concern about his employment; however, Davis's job 
was never at risk. (Rec. 1194, p. 650-651). 
19. In response to No. 10. There is no evidence that Hatch stalked, harassed 
or threatened Davis in any way. Hatch has a right to attend Town Council meetings and 
to express his concerns about the Town and the State Park. Davis testified at trial, that 
it was he that got up during the Town meeting and walked over and confronted Hatch, 
saying "if you have something to say, you ought to be man enough to say it to my face." 
Davis was not a withdrawn and fearful man; and was not in fear of Hatch. (Rec. 1194, 
pp. 631-632). 
20. In response to Nos. 13, 14 & 15; evidence was presented, other than by 
Hatch and Mitchell, that an assault and battery did occur, such as Joel and Carol Greer. 
These are recorded in the Police Report of Monte Luker, which was admitted as an 
Exhibit at trial. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 80). 
21. In response to No. 16. There was no evidence presented that Hatch 
accused Judy Davis of stealing mail, or petitioned that she be removed as postmistress. 
There was no evidence presented, based on personal knowledge, of any ethics 
investigation into Judy Davis as postmistress. Judy Davis did not know of any letters or 
petitions, or action taken against her as a result of Hatch. (Rec. 1194, p. 354). David 
Wescott, the author of the B.O.S.S. letter did not testify and the letter does not contain 
any quotes from Hatch. This B.O.S.S. was letter attached to another letter and was never 
mentioned at trial. 
22. Davis claims that when Judy Davis tells him of Hatch, he gets upset. 
However, Judy Davis, herself, never felt threatened, never suffered any emotional 
distress, and could not think of any outrageous or intolerable thing that was done against 
her by Hatch. Judy Davis did not file against Hatch for infliction of emotional distress 
or for any other claim. (Rec. 1194, pp. 340-341). 
23. In response to No. 17, there was no testimony of anything Hatch did a few 
months before trial; and no testimony of any specific conduct by Hatch against Mr. Davis 
personally since 1993. The claim that the prior suits were against Judy Davis, personally 
and frivolous, was a misrepresentation to the trial court and to this Court. Davis sued the 
Town of Boulder and prevailed in his 1996 lawsuit in a federal jury trial in 1999. 
24. In response to No. 18, there is no evidence that Hatch filed frivolous 
lawsuits. In fact, Hatch prevailed in the federal lawsuit that he filed against the Town of 
Boulder. 
25. In response to No. 25; (a) Davis's job was never in jeopardy; and he had 
no reason to believe otherwise (Rec. 1194, pp. 650-651); (b) Davis did not become 
withdrawn, and did not shy away from Hatch. Davis is the one that who confronted 
Hatch at the Town meeting (Rec. 1194, pp. 631-632); (c) Davis suffered these symptoms 
before meeting Hatch and prior to the 4 year limitation period. Davis did not try to 
obtain any medical relief for these symptoms (Rec. 1193, p. 344,1194 pp. 653-655); and 
did not see Dr. Gregory about his symptoms until a month before trial and after the 
discovery deadline had passed. (See Motion in Limine, Rec. 654-659). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is one issue on appeal, the finding on Davis's claim for Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress that Hatch claims is not supported by the evidence. In 
challenging this finding Hatch has provided a transcript of all relevant evidence to 
support this finding. Hatch did perfect the record and did provide a transcript of all 
evidence relevant to this finding.1 
Hatch's appeal involves numerous legal issues, raised in the record, with 
various motions, including a Motion to Dismiss (Rec. 52-57), a Motion for Summary 
Judgment (Rec. 282-454), and Motions in Limine (Rec. 654-659). These legal issues go 
far beyond Hatch's challenge to the finding on Davis's claim for Intentional Infliction 
of Emotional Distress. 
For instance, Hatch has maintained from the beginning that Davis's 
Counterclaim fails to state a legal claim for Malicious Prosecution, since the underlying 
proceeding had not been terminated in his favor. Hatch filed a Motion to Dismiss and 
this claim should have been dismissed in the initial stages. Hatch should not be required 
to perfect the record, or marshal the evidence, to show that this claim was legally 
]The testimony claimed to be missing of eleven witnesses, were witnesses of the 
assault and battery at the February 1996 Town Meeting. They did not present evidence about 
Davis's claim of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. In fact they could not recall 
anything happening at the Town Meeting. 
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deficient from the beginning. This issue was raised and preserved in Hatch's Motion to 
Dismiss. In fact, Judge Mower ruled on this very issue, from which Hatch sought an 
interlocutory appeal.2 
Davis's Counterclaim also fails to allege the necessary elements for an 
Abuse of Process claim. This Court made it clear that a claim for civil abuse of process 
requires a prerequisite that the prior proceedings have terminated in favor of the 
person against whom they were brought" Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 
950, 959 (UtApp. 1989); Winters v. Schulman. 977 P.2d 1218 (Ut.App. 1999). Davis's 
Counterclaim fails to allege this prerequisite; therefore, this claim should have been 
dismissed in the initial stages along with the Malicious Prosecution claim. Davis appears 
to completely ignores this straight forward ruling. 
Furthermore, Davis asserts that Hatch abused the process in filing the 
current lawsuit for purposes of harassment, a means to meike money, and to extort Davis 
to acquiesce to Hatch's political and philosophical views. (Davis's Brief p.31). Even if 
these claims were proven true, they are legally deficient under the law to state a claim for 
Abuse of Process.3 
2The interlocutory appeal was not granted, but obviously Hatch's Motion had merit as 
Judge McKiff did finally dismiss Davis's claim for Malicious Prosecution at the close of 
evidence at trial. Davis claims that it was proper to dismiss it at this time, i.e., at the close of 
evidence, but offers no case law in support of this assertion. 
3Most people who file lawsuits seek money damages. Cases involving extortion for 
abuse of process purposes, do not involve extorting someone to a person's political or 
philosophical views, but extorting payment of a debt or seizure of property by some improper 
means of attachment, execution, garnishment, arrest, or criminal prosecution. PROSSER, Law 
of Torts, § 121 (4th ed, 1971). None of these types of claims were asserted or were even an 
issue in this case. 
_ s _ 
Davis asserts that for his abuse of process claim he does not have to show 
a lack of probable cause in bringing the underlying action. (Davis Brief p. 32). However, 
the Utah case Davis relies on (Davis Brief p. 25), Gilbert v. Ince. 981 P.2d 841, 845 
(Utah 1999) clearly states, that the underlying action must be brought without probable 
cause. Id. at 846. The Utah Supreme Court, further stated that Gilbert had the obligation 
of proving that Ince acted "without probable cause." Therefore, the Abuse of Process 
claim should have been dismissed after the court's ruling, at the end of Hatch's case-in-
chief, when the court found that Hatch had met his prima facie burden on the facts 
sufficient to go to the jury. Westar Mortgage Corp. v. Jackson, 61 P.3d 823 (N.M. 2002). 
Davis argues that the trial court properly presented the probable cause 
question to the jury for decision, along with the assault and battery claim.4 (Davis Brief 
p. 32) However, this was in error. This same argument was made to the New Mexico 
Supreme Court in Westar Mortgage Corp. v. Jackson, the New Mexico Court stated, that 
the existence of probable cause in the underlying proceeding, and whether the facts 
amount to probable cause is a question of law for the court to decide, and not the jury. 
Id. at 832. 
In addition, although Davis alleges the action was filed with an improper 
motive. He does not allege or establish any willful act in use of the process not regular 
in the course of the proceeding. This was raised by Hatch in the supplemental cases 
4The jury was not deciding the issue of probable cause in this instance, but was 
deciding the issue of assault and battery by a preponderance of the evidence, a totally 
different standard. 
o 
requested by the court. (See Addendum, Ex. A). To find otherwise, would open the 
flood gates to abuse of process claims every time a plaintiff fails to prevail in his case, 
although he establishes a prima facie case, and all the necessary elements to submit his 
claims to the jury. Furthermore, an improper act may not be inferred from an improper 
motive alone; if the act itself is still regular, the motive, ulterior or otherwise, is 
immaterial.5 Bosler v. ShucL 714 P.2d 1231 (Wyo. 1986). 
The evidence in this case, even when marshaled Davis's favor, fails to 
establish any conduct that can be considered "outrageous and intolerable"or offensive 
against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality; or that Davis actually 
suffered severe emotional distress from such conduct. Samms v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 
346-47 (Utah 1961); In re Estate of Grimm, 784 P.2d 1238, 1246 (Ut.App. 1989). 
Furthermore, Utah's 4 year limitation period applies and Davis' s claims are 
based on actions which occurred in the early 1990s, well beyond the 4 year limitation 
period. In considering damages, the jury should have been instructed as to this statutory 
period, as Davis's recovery, if any, would be limited to this statutory period. Breiggar 
Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 52 P.3d 1133 (Utah 2002). Furthermore, 
Davis testified that he suffered emotional distress before the 4 year limitation period. 
Therefore, an issue of fact was raised for the jury to decide, when Davis first suffered 
damages and when statute of limitations commenced. Andreini v. Hultgren, 860 P.2d 
916 (Ut.App. 1993); Hodges v. Howell 4 P.3d 803 (Ut.App. 2000) (at what particular 
5This is directly contrary to the Instruction given to the jury in this case, which lists 
the ulterior motive, as the one essential element for Abuse of Process. (Rec. 744) 
1 A 
legal injury occurs to commence statute of limitations is a factual question for the jury 
to determine). 
Davis's claim for emotional distress is based mainly on Hatch's dealings 
with his wife, Judy Davis (Rec. 321, p. 21). However, the general rule is that liability is 
limited to family members who are present at the time. Restatement (Second) Of Torts 
§ 46(b)(2); Samms v. Eccles. 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 1961). Hatch cannot be found liable 
for such conduct in this case, when Mr. Davis was not present. 
Davis's Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim against Hatch is 
also prohibited by the First Amendment, which specifically provides citizens the right to 
petition their government, and to be critical of public officials. Hatch raised this right 
in his Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. 311-312) and in his Motion in Limine (Rec. 
656). Hatch had a constitutional right to voice his grievances to state officials. 
The trial court also improperly issued supplemental orders and writs of 
execution before there was a final judgment entered. D'Ashton v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 
349 (UtApp. 1992); Cheves v. Williams, 993 P.2d 1911 (Utah 1999). A judgment 
which does not adjudicate all the claims between the parties is not a final judgment and 
cannot support the issuance of an execution. CIT Financial Services v. Erbs Indoor RV 
Center, 702 P.2d 858 (Id.App. 1985). 
Finally, the trial court did not certify the Partial Judgment as a final 
judgment under Rule 54(b); and did not make the necessary findings and determination 
to certify it as a final judgment under Rule 54(b). In fact, the trial court specifically states 
_ 11 _ 
that it is not a final judgment for purposes of appeal, and that it does not resolve all the 
issues raised between the parties, contrary to any findings necessary under Rule 54(b). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE APPELLANT HAS PERFECTE D THE RECORD 
AND HAS MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT 
OF THE FINDINGS THAT HE IS CHALLENGING. 
Davis complains that the records was not perfected on appeal. Rule 11(e), 
Utah R. App. P. provides that, for an appellant to urge on appeal that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include 
in the record a transcript of all evidence,6 relevant to such finding or conclusion. 
Hatch has complied with this requirement and has provided a transcript of 
all evidence relevant to his challenge of the jury's findings on Davis's claim for 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. Hatch is not challenging the trial court's 
rulings on the other issues based upon a lack of evidence. For example, Hatch is not 
challenging the court's finding that there was probable cause to present the assault and 
battery claim to the jury. However, Hatch is asserting that the Malicious Prosecution and 
Abuse of Process Claims should have been initially dismissed for legal reasons. 
Furthermore, Davis did not file an appeal on the finding of probable cause at the end of 
Hatch's case-in-chief on his assault and battery claim; nor on the dismissal of his 
Malicious Prosecution claim, and Davis did not request a transcript to challenge these 
6Davis argues that there needs to be a transcript of the legal arguments; however, this 
Court can review such legal issues without a transcript of the arguments, it is only a transcript 




The eleven witnesses Davis claims to have been excluded, were witnesses 
of the assault and battery at a February 1996 Town Meeting. They did not testify about 
Davis's emotional distress; and Davis has failed to set forth any alleged testimony, that 
these witnesses testified to regarding Davis's emotional distress.8 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DISMISS THE MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIM 
DURING THE PRE-TRAIL STAGES. 
A. Davis's Counterclaim fails to state a legal claim 
for Malicious Prosecution. 
Davis's Counterclaim fails to state a legal claim for Malicious Prosecution, 
since the underlying proceeding had not been terminated in his favor. Baird v. 
Intermountain School Federal C.U.. 55 P.2d 877, 878 (Utah 1976). This claim should 
have been dismissed in the initial stages. It is not necessary to perfect the record or 
marshal the evidence to show that this claim was legally deficient from the beginning. 
This issue was raised and preserved in Hatch's Motion to Dismiss. In fact, Judge Mower 
ruled on this very issue, from which Hatch sought an interlocutory appeal 
7Davis claims that a transcript was not properly ordered from the court. However, 
Hatch did order a transcript from the court executive as required under Rule 11 (e), as 
evidenced by the documents in the file, and letter sent in response by the court clerk regarding 
the transcribing. (See Addendum, Ex. D). As far as notice to Davis, Davis has been aware of 
this appeal, has been executing on the judgment, and has had access to the file, including the 
transcript request, and correspondence by the court. In fact, Davis had the Sixth District 
Court Clerk, testify in Bankruptcy Court against Hatch. Davis cannot claim he did not have 
an opportunity to order any transcripts, he desired. 
8Davis claims that two witnesses testified that Hatch bragged about his ability file 
lawsuits rather than working at a job. However this does not go to support any of the 
elements in Davis's claim for Infliction of Emotional Distress 
Davis now concedes that the Malicious Prosecution claim should have been 
dismissed, because the underlying action had not been dismissed in Davis's favor at the 
time the Counterclaim was filed. (Davis did not appeal this ruling). Davis rather 
contends that it was proper for the trial court to wait until the close of the evidence to 
dismiss the Malicious Prosecution claim. (Davis Brief p. 21). However, such a ruling 
would be directly contrary to Utah case law and the clear mandate that dismissal is a pre-
requisite. Baird v. Intermountain, supra. Davis does not provide any case law in support 
of his assertion, which lies directly contrary to Utah law, but only argues that it is 
harmless error.9 Id. 
B. The Jury should have been informed of the Court's 
dismissal of the Malicious Prosecution claim. 
After 4 days of trail and evidence, the court decided to dismiss the 
Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process claims, since all of the elements had not 
been satisfied, and the underlying proceeding had not been decided in Davis's favor 
based on a lack of probable cause. The court then decided to dismiss just the Malicious 
Prosecution claim, although both claims were based on the filing of the lawsuit without 
probable cause or hope of success. 
After dismissing the Malicious Prosecution claim, the court failed to inform 
the jury that this claim was being dismissed and the reasons for the dismissal, i.e., that 
9To say that it is harmless error to allow a party to proceed without satisfying this legal 
element, would totally vitiate this legal element established as a pre-requisite to state such a 
claim; and would throw the flood gates open for every answer filed, to now contain a claim 
for malicious prosecution, before there has been any determinalion of the underlying 
proceeding. 
1 A 
in order to find Malicious Prosecution, the case must first be decided in favor of the 
accused based on a lack of probable cause. This prejudiced Hatch because throughout 
trial Davis had combined the two claims and maintained that the claims against him were 
filed without any hope of success or probable cause.10 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DISMISS THE ABUSE OF PROCESS CLAIM. 
A. Davis's Counterclaim fails to state a legal claim 
for Abuse of Process. 
This Court made it clear that a claim for civil abuse of process requires 
that the prior proceedings have terminated in favor of the person against whom they 
were brought" Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 959 (Ut.App. 1989). 
In Winters v. Schulman. 977 P.2d 1218 (Ut.App. 1999), this Court states that a 
prerequisite to an abuse of process claim is a that the prior suit terminates in favor of 
the defendant therein. Davis's Counterclaim fails to allege this prerequisite; therefore, 
his claim for Abuse of Process should have been dismissed in the initial stages along with 
the Malicious Prosecution claim. 
Furthermore, Davis asserts that Hatch abused the process in filing the 
current lawsuit for purposes of harassment, a means to make money, and to extort Davis 
to acquiesce to Hatch's political and philosophical views. (Davis's Brief p.31). Even if 
these claims were proven true, they are still legally deficient to state a claim for Abuse 
10This also likely resulted in inconsistent findings, as the trial dismissed the Malicious 
Prosecution, because there was no lack of probable cause established on the underlying claim, 
while the jury awarded damages for abuse of process based upon the filing of the underlying 
action, without probable cause. 
of Process. Cases involving extortion for purpose of abuse of process, do not involve 
extorting someone to your political or philosophical views, but extorting payment of a 
debt or seizure of property by improper means of attachment, execution, garnishment, 
arrest, or criminal prosecution. PROSSER, Law of Torts, § 121 (4th ed., 1971). None 
of these types of claims were asserted or were even an issue in this case. 
Davis in his Counterclaim never alleged or established at trial, how the 
filing of this action, for assault and battery, extorted Davis or required him to comply 
with Hatch's political or philosophical views. This claim should have been dismissed. 
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 70 P.3d 17, 29 (Utah 2003). 
Furthermore, Davis's claim for Abuse of Process is missing another 
essential element, i.e., a willful act in use of the judicial process not proper in the regular 
course of the proceedings. Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce, 988 P.2d 143 (Az.App. 1999). 
There was no evidence presented, that Hatch used any process not proper in the regular 
course of the proceedings. This claim should have been dismissed in the initial stages. 
Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, supra at 29. 
Finally, the Abuse of Process claim alleges, that the case was improperly 
filed without probable cause; therefore the same sound judicial policy which requires 
termination of prior litigation for malicious prosecution should apply to the Abuse of 
Process claim in this case. Friedman v. Roseth Corp. 75 N.Y.S.2d 515; Terry v. Wonder 
Seal Co., 170 S.E.2d 745 (Ga.App. 1969). 
B. The jury was not properly instructed on the necessary 
elements for the Abuse of Process Claim. 
As stated above abuse of process requires two elements: (1) an ulterior 
motive; and (2) a willful act in use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the 
proceedings. Giles v. Hill Lewis Marce. 988 P.2d 143 (Az.App. 1999); Executive Mgt. 
Ltd. v. Ticor Title Ins. Co.. 963 P.2d 464 (N.M. 1998). 
The court never dealt with the second element for abuse of process. There 
was no willful act by Hatch in use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the 
proceedings alleged or established at trial. There was no misuse of discovery, no 
improper seizure of property, no arrest, no criminal proceedings initiated, none of the 
uses generally found in an abuse of process case. The fact that Hatch did not ultimately 
prevail, does not by itself constitute an "improper use of the process," Crease, supra. 
A willful act under the abuse of process claim requires an overt act done 
in addition to the initiating of the suit; thus, the mere filing of the lawsuit, even for an 
improper purpose, is not a proper basis for an abuse of process claim. Meidinger v. 
Koniag. Inc.. 31 P.2 77 (Alaska 2001); Caudle v. Mendel 994 P.2d 372 (Alaska 1999); 
DeVanev v. Thriftwav Marketing Corp.. 953 P.2d 277 (N.M. 1997) cert, denied 524 U.S. 
915; Giles v. Hill Marce, 988 P.2d 143 (Arz.App. 1990). Moreover, improper acts may 
not be inferred from an improper motive alone; if the act itself is still regular, the motive 
ulterior or otherwise is immaterial. Bosler v. Shuck. 714 P.2d 1231 (Wyo. 1986). This 
is directly contrary to the jury instruction given regarding Abuse of Process in this case, 
stating that the ulterior motive or purpose was the essential element. (Rec. 744). 
IV. THE DETERMINATION OF "PROBABLE CAUSE" 
FOR PURPOSES OF THE ABUSE OF PROCESS 
CLAIM SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN LEFT FOR THE 
JURY TO DECIDE. 
The existence of probable cause in a proceeding underlying a claim for 
abuse of process is a question of law for the court. Westar Mortgage Corp. v. Jackson, 
61 P.3d 823 (N.M. 2002). Even if facts are in dispute, the role of the jury is only to 
determine the facts bearing on the probable cause question; however, whether those facts 
constitute probable cause remains a matter for the court to decide, not the jury. Id. 
At the end of Hatch's case-in-chief, the trail court found sufficient probable 
cause on Hatch's claims to go to the jury. Specifically, "that there is room within the 
evidence that has been admitted for the jury to reach either conclusion with respect to 
all claims" that, if Mr. Hatch is believed and Ms. Mitchell is believed, it could find 
both assault and battery "n (Trans. Vol, II, pg 712). 
Davis claims that the trial court properly presented the probable cause 
question to the jury for the jury to decide.12 (Davis Brief p. 32) However, this was in 
error. This same argument was made to the New Mexico Supreme Court in Westar 
Mortgage Corp. v. Jackson, Id. at 832, and the Court stated that the existence of 
11
 Davis claims that Hatch failed to perfect the record or marshal the evidence, but 
Hatch is not challenging this finding by the trial court (and Davis did not appeal), rather 
Hatch is asserting that based on this finding, it was improper for the trial court to submit the 
question of probable cause on the underlying claim to the jury, especially when the jury was 
also considering the assault and battery claim on the preponderance standard. 
12The jury was not deciding the issue of probable cause in this instance, but was 
deciding the issue of assault and battery by a preponderance of the evidence, a totally 
different standard. 
probable cause in such cases, and whether the facts amount to probable cause, is a 
question of law for the court to decide, not for the jury to decide. 
V. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE 
CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS. 
A. The relevant record was provided and the 
evidence marshaled, but it fails to adequately 
support Davis's claim for Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress. 
All the evidence regarding the issue of extreme and outrageous conduct has 
been marshaled in favor of Davis, as specifically set forth in Hatch initial Brief, 
Statement of Facts, paragraphs 5 through 24, which include the letters written by Hatch, 
contained in Defendant's Exhibit 103. This evidence marshaled and viewed in Davis's 
favor is not sufficient to support a finding of extreme or outrageous conduct. 
Hatch wrote letters, upon Davis's invitation, to Davis's supervisors (which 
was Hatch's right) complaining about an Indian burial display and other operations at the 
State Park, which were legitimate issues. Hatch also complained about his treatment 
from Davis, as being unresponsive and unprofessional. Hatch further requested an 
investigation of the matters and the policies at the Park and stated that Davis may not be 
the right person to continue to manage the Park.13 However, according to Davis's own 
testimony, Hatch's complaints never put Davis's job in jeopardy; and Davis never 
received any indication that his job was in jeopardy. 
13Davis claims Hatch failed to marshal the evidence on this issue, but fails to set forth 
any facts, which Hatch allegedly failed to marshal, or present to the Court, on this issue. 
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The actions of Hatch in writing letters to Davis and his supervisors, who 
are government official, and asking questions about the policies at the state Park and 
complaining about the way Davis ran the Park and treated Hatch, and even asking for an 
investigation and stating that Davis needs to be replaced as Park manager; do not rise to 
the level necessary to constitute "extreme and outrageous" conduct. Andrews v. Stallings, 
8982 P.2d 611 (N.M.App. 1995); Snvder v. Medical Services Corp. of Eastern 
Washington. 985 P.2d 1023 (Wash.App.Div.3 1999)(insults, threats, and annoying 
employee, does not rise to necessary level); Garcia v.Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164 (Wyo. 
1996)(no claim for bad taste, boorishness, condescension, obnoxiousness or social 
ineptitude); Keates v. City of Vancouver. 869 P.2d 88 (Wash.App.Div.2 1994)(police 
officer yelling at husband suspected of murdering wife, was not outrageous, even though 
officer yelled into husband's face about murdering his wife, was insulting to husband and 
unbecoming to officer); and Breeden v. League Services Corp., 575 P.2d 1374 (Okla. 
1978)(where collection company sent letters to debtor's home, to her work, made several 
attempts to contact her by phone, both at home and at work, totaling 16 attempts, and in 
one call called her a God damned liar and deadbeat, collection company's conduct was 
not outrageous). 
Furthermore, termination from employment is not sufficient to constitute 
extreme and outrageous conduct. Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025 (Utah 
1987)(mere discharge from employment does not rise to level of outrageous or 
intolerable conduct, even if based on false reasons); Dubois v. Grand Central 872 P.2d 
_ on _ 
1073 (Ut.App. 1994); Robertson v. Utah Fuel Co., 889 P.2d 1382 (Ut.App. 1995) cert. 
denied (discharge from employment not intolerable even if employee is required to 
discuss drug addiction). 
B. Davis's claim for emotional distress based on actions 
that occurred in the early 1990s is barred by Utah's 
four (4) year statute of limitations. 
Davis's claim for emotional distress is based on actions that occurred and 
damages suffered in early 1989 and 1990, far beyond the 4 year limitation period. The 
letters were written between 1990 and 1993, well beyond the limitation period. 
Therefore, any claim for damages during this period of time should have been dismissed 
and this evidence should have been excluded. Davidson Lumber Sales, Inc. v. 
Bonneville Inv.. Inc., 794 P.2d 11,19 (Utah 1990) 
C. A jury instruction should have been given regarding 
Utah's four (4) year statute of limitations for infliction 
of emotional distress. 
As set forth above, Davis's claims, occurring beyond the 4 year limitation 
period should have been barred and this evidence excluded at trial. If not excluded, at 
a minimum, the jury should have been instructed regarding the 4 year limitation period 
as Davis is not entitled to recover for damages beyond this statutory period. Breiggar 
Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 52 P.3d 1133 (Utah 2002). 
In addition, Davis testified at trial that he suffered his emotional distress 
at the time of each incident, in the early 1990s; and the court in its Post-Verdict ruling 
found that there was no single incident that constituted extreme and outrageous conduct. 
Therefore, this creates a factual question for the jury to decide when Davis first suffered 
his alleged damages, and if such injury was beyond the statutory time period. Andreini 
v. Hultgren. 860 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993); Hodges v. Howell, 4 P.3d 803 (Ut.App. 2000). 
D. There is a "presence requirement" necessary for 
infliction of emotional distress for actions directed 
to another party. 
Davis claims intentional infliction of emotional distress as a result of 
Hatch's dealings with his wife, Judith Davis, as the Boulder Town Clerk.14 However, 
for a person to recover for such emotional distress that person must be present at the 
time. Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 46(b)(2); Samms v. Eccles. 358 P.2d 344 (Utah 
1961); Lundv. Caple. 675 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1984). Even in the Wyoming case, cited by 
Davis, the court concedes that this is the general rule followed in most jurisdictions and 
at most times. R.D. v. W.H.. 875 P.2d 26 (Wyo. 1994). The general rule should be 
followed in this case. The circumstances giving rise to au exception to the general rule 
are not present in this case.15 
Hatch cannot be found liable for such conduct, when Davis was not 
present. If Hatch is found liable for such conduct, then there would be no limitation to 
this claim. Furthermore, since emotional distress is the only damage claimed by Davis, 
14Davis in his Brief (pg. 39) claims that Hatch's dealings with his wife was of minute 
consequence. However, Davis testified that it was Hatch's dealings with his wife that was the 
most upsetting to him. (Rec. 321, p. 21). 
15In R.D. v. W.H., supra, although plaintiff was not present when his child was given a 
firearm and drugs, he was present and did witness the immediale effect of his child's death on 
a drug overdose. In this case, Judy Davis did not suffer from anything Hatch allegedly did; 
and in fact, Judy Davis herself suffered no emotional distress from Hatch. 
and he has no actual damages, he cannot recover for any actions directed to a third 
person. Restatement (Second) Of Torts § 47. 
VI. HATCH HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE 
CRITICAL OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND TO 
PETITION HIS GOVERNMENT WITH HIS 
GRIEVANCES. 
Hatch raised his First Amendment rights in this case, in his Motion for 
Summary Judgment; his Motion in Limine; and at the Pre-Trial Conference. The 
criticism of government is at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free 
speech. Criticism of those responsible for government operations must be free, lest 
criticism of government itself be penalized. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1996). 
The First Amendment requires clear and convincing evidence that the 
statements published were false and were made with "actual malice, " which does not 
refer to ill will, but rather to knowledge of the falsity.16 West v. Thomson Newspapers, 
835 P.2d 179 (Ut.App. 1992) cert, denied 843 P.2d 1042, vacated on other grounds, 872 
P.2d 999; Chapin v. Knight-Ridder. Inc., 993 F.2d 1087 (4th Cir. 1993). Actual malice 
is required otherwise would-be critics of official conduct would remain silent and would 
be deterred from voicing their criticism. Costello v. Ocean County Observer, 643 A.2d 
1012 (N.J. 1994). Hatch's letters critical of Davis and his operation of the State Park is 
protected under the First Amendment. 
At common law actual malice connoted ill will and a conscious disregard for the 
rights and safety of others; and is constitutionally insufficient to prove actual malice in 
context of public official. Vaanese v. Gall 518 N.E.2d 1177 (Ohio 1988) cert, denied 487 
U.S. 1206. 
. 91 . 
VII. THE TRAIL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EXPERT 
TESTIMONY AFTER THE COURT PREVIOUSLY 
RULED AT THE PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE THAT 
SUCH TESTIMONY WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED. 
At the Pre-trial Conference the court ruled that Davis's disclosure of his 
expert witness was not sufficient and did not comply with the Rule of Civil Procedure. 
Davis was to provide his expert for a deposition and was to immediately provide the 
reports. Davis's expert never did this and yet was able to testify at trial, contrary to the 
court's previous ruling. 
Hatch's counsel did not have an opportunity to review the reports to rebut 
them or to take the expert's deposition before trial by the end of the week, as previously 
ordered by the court at the Pre-trial Conference. This greatly prejudiced Hatch at trial, 
and this information should have been excluded at trial consistent with the court's 
previous ruling at the Pre-trial Conference. It was an abuse of discretion for the court to 
allow Davis's expert to testify contrary to its previous order. 
Davis claims that Hatch's counsel had months to take the deposition of 
Davis's expert, however, the expert did not provide any expert report until after the 
discovery deadline had past. In fact, the report was not filed until after the Pre-Trial 
Conference and the expert failed to appear at her scheduled deposition as the parties 
agreed at the Pre-trial Conference. It was prejudicial to Hatch and an abuse of discretion 
for the trial court to rule in favor of Hatch on this issue at the Pre-trial Conference and 
then at trial change its ruling and say that Hatch in some way was trying to avoid the 
testimony. 
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT NEVER ENTERED A FINAL 
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 54(b) URCP. 
It is clear from the record that a final judgment had not been entered at the time 
the trial court issued its Order of April 11,2002.n Davis now claims that Rule 54(b) allows 
the trial court to enter a final judgment. However, the trial court was never asked to certify 
its Partial Judgment as a final judgment under Rule 54(b); and the trial court never made the 
necessary findings or determination to enter the judgment as final for purposes of Rule 
54(b). To the contrary, the trial court indicates that its ruling is not final, that it is only a 
partial judgment, that there are further issues to be resolved between the parties, and the 
judgment is not to be considered final for purposes of appeal. The Partial Judgment 
therefore was not entered as a final judgment by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons the Judgment should be set aside; Davis's claims 
dismissed with prejudice; and Hatch should be able to proceed on his claims. 
DATED t h i s ^ d a y of March, 2004. 
BOND & CALL, L.C. 
.ux£* 
ttorney for Petitioners and Appellants 
17Davis claims that Hatch fraudulently transferred his assets, however, there is no 
evidence of this on the record. To the contrary Hatch testified that he did not own the property 
outright, although it was deeded to him, and that he was purchasing the property from Mitchell, 
who had not been paid in full, but still had an interest in the property. (Rec. 1194, pp. 693-694). 
There was also no finding of fraud by the Bankruptcy Court and such allegations should be 
stricken and/or disregarded. 
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Exhibit "A 
LAW OFFICES OF " W ^ ^ * *• 
B O N D & CALL, L.C. n u n r r w r * , , p r 
KEVIN B O N D , P C INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS B U D G E W CALL P C 
id(5)bondcall law com ~ bcall@bondcall law com 
luiu/uunuudii i d w u u i n 311 S O UTH STATE S T R E E T S U I T E 4 IO 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE (SOI) 521-8900 GARFIELD COUNTY 
FAX (80I) 521-9700 N O F!l F H 
APR 1 8 2002 
. Clerk 
April 15, 2002 Deputy 
VIA FACSIMILE (435) 896-8047 AND REGULAR MAIL 
I ne Honorable Kay L Mclff 
Fudge of the Sixth District Court 
55 South Main Street 
Panguitch, UT 84759 
Re Julian Dean Hatch v Larry Davis - Abuse of Process Claim 
Case No 980600010 
Dear Judge Mclff 
This letter is in response to the Court's invitation for additional cases and reasons 
vhy judgment for abuse of process should not be entered in the above-referenced matter 
In the case Arnica Mutual Insurance Co v Schettler, 768 P 2d 950, 959 (Utah App 
989), the Court of Appeals makes clear that an action for abuse of process was premature when 
IVII proceedings on which it was based and had not yet terminated 
While the Utah courts have often treated abuse of process and malicious prosecution 
i a tangential manner, the Court, as well as the parties in this case, have treated them likewise 
•jring the proceeding* and rhrough the tna1 until atter all the evidence had been presented In 
ssence, the abuse of process tried in this case is a claim for wrongful use of civil proceedings and 
ot an abuse of process claim as referred to by the Defendants in their supplemental memorandum 
f law regarding abuse of process 
Indeed, a true claim for abuse of process requires two (2) elements, (1) an ulterior 
lotive, and (2) a willful act in use of the process not proper in the regular conduct of the 
x>ceedings Giles v Hill Lewis Marce, 988 P 2d 143 (Az App 1999) and Executive Met Ltd 
Ticor Title Ins Co , 963 P 2d 464 (N M 1998) There was no allegation or evidence of the 
cond element presented in the proceedings or trial in this case The result of harassment alone 
not enough 
r - \ / i I I P M T k 
The Honorable Kay L Mclff 
Judge of the Sixth District Court 
April 15, 2002 
Page 2 
Since the parties and the Court in this case treated the abuse of process claim as a 
wrongful filing of civil proceeding, and not an abuse of process claim requiring a wilful act in use 
of the process not proper in the regular proceedings, the Court should treat the matter as a 
wrongful use of civil proceedings and should not enter any judgment for abuse of process 
Smtereiy, 
BOND & CALL, L C 
BWC/sjo 
cc James C Bradshaw, Esq (Via Facsimile) 
Exhibit "B 
LAW OFFICES OF 
BOND & CALL, L.C. 
KEVIN B O N D P C INDEPENDENT PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS B U D G E W CALL P C 
)nd@bondcall law com
 3 | | 5 Q U T H S J A T E S T R E E T S U 1 T E AlQ bcall@bondcal! law com 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
T E L E P H O N E (801) 5 2 1 - 8 9 0 0 
FAX ( 8 0 I ) 5 2 1 - 9 7 0 0 
GARFIELD COUNTY 
NO.. — FILE° 
APR 2 2 2002 
-Clerk 
.Deputy 
April 18, 2002 
VIA FACSIMILE (435) 896-8047 AND REGULAR MAIL 
The Honorable Kay L Mclff 
Judge of me Sixth Dismu Couu 
55 South Mam Street 
Panguitch, UT 84759 
Re Julian Dean Hatch v Larry Davis - Order Precluding Plaintiffs 
Transfer or Encumbrance of Property 
Case No 980600010 
Dear Judge Mclff 
I received the Order Precluding Plaintiffs Transfer or Encumbrance of Property 
in the above-referenced matter I indicated that Mr Hatch would have to be personally served 
with the Order before it took effect and Mr Bradshaw agreed Therefore, the Order should not 
be effective until after service is made on Mr Hatch This is consistent with due process and the 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which require personal service of such an order 
Furthermore, the Order indicates that it would end 90 days after final judgment is 
entered on the jury's verdict The Motion only requests a period of 45 days after final judgment 
is entered This change also needs to be made 
Sincerely, 
BOND & CALL, L C 
Call 
BWC/sjo 
cc James C Bradshaw, Esq (Via Facsimile) 
CVUID!^ O 
Exhibit "C 
n OCT 2 4 2003 PI 
US BANKRUPTCY COURT 
OISTRICT OF UTAH 
fNSON & TREASE, P.C. 
Y L. TREASE (#4929) 
rneys for Debtor(s) 
Julian D. Hatch 
xchange Place 
on Building, Suite 200 
Lake City, UT 84111 
phone No. (801) 596-9400 
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION 
JULIAN D. HATCH, 
Debtors). 
Bankruptcy No.: 03B-21734 
[Chapter 13] 
Judge: Judith A. BouWen 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Creditor Larry Davis' Motion to Dismiss Petition came on for hearing on July 28. 2003, 
August 7, 2003, before the Honorable Judith A. Boulden, U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge. The 
>r was present and represented by Jory L. Trease. Creditor Larry Davis was represented by 
s C. Bradshaw. After hearing the testimony of witnesses, arguments of counsel and good 
; appearing, the court made factual and legal findings on the record which are hereby 
porated into this order. The Court having reviewed the evidence and being otherwise fully 
«*»%#! i s i « % i f n 
advised in the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. That the Debtor's Bankruptcy Petition is dismissed pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1307. 
COURT CLERK'S 
CERTD71CATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that this day of , 2003,1 caused a true and 
set copy of the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL to be delivered to the following by 
-siting a copy of the same in the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid and addressed 
Hows: 
J. Vincent Cameron ( via ECF) 
Chapter 13 Trustee 
47 West 200 South, Suite 320 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
U.S. Trustee (Via ECF) 
#9 Exchange Place, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
James C. Bradshaw (Hand-Delivery) 
BROWN, BRADSHAW & MOFFAT 
10 West Broadway, Suite 210 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Steven W. Baeder 
333 East 400 South, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Julian D. Hatch 
165 East Burr Trail Road 
P.O. Box 1365 
Boulder, UT 84716 
JOHNSON & TREASE, P.C. 
#9 Exchange Place 
Boston Building, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 





g>txtfj Bitftrict Court 
February 4,2003 
BUDGE W. CALL 
Attorney at Law 
311 South State Street, Suite 410 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Hatch vs. Davis Request for Transcript 
Dear Mr Call: 
First let me apologize for the lack of communication between my office and yours. I 
have been out of the office on personal leave since September and returned on the 20th of 
January. Since that time, I have learned that the transcript request has not been completed. Due 
to a conflict with the court reporter the transcript request will take more than 90 days to 
complete. I have contacted an official court transcriber approved by the Administrative Office of 
the Courts and she has agreed to have the transcript prepared in 30 days. 
I had a conversation with Mr. Hatch today regarding this matter, he has instructed me to 
forward the check back to your office. You will need to make contact with the reporter and 
arrange for payment at that time. I don't believe that she will start on the transcript until she has 
received payment so you may want to contact her as soon as you can. Again I apologize for any 
problems this may have caused you. Please contact me if you need any additional information. 
The reporter's name is: 
JERIKEARBEY 
1230 Gaylene Circle 




District Court Clerk 
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Administrative Office of the Courts 
Official Court Transcribers 
(current as of 08/28/02) 
Penny C. Abbott 
1817 East 800 South 
Salem, Utah 84653 
(801)4234009 
Lora Barker 
4375 Redwood Cove 
Cedar Hills, Utah 84062 
(801)785-7637 
Carolyn Erickson 
1775 Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
(801)523-1186 
Independent Reporting & Videography 
Attn: Ann M. Love 
1220 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 538-2333 
Jeri Kearbey 
1230 Gaylene Circle 
Sandy, Utah 84094 
(801)566-4540 
Pamela C. Smith 
3454 Creek Road 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
(801)942-6430 
Laura Thompson 
1258 North 1100 East 
Layton, Utah 84040 
(801)546-4008 
Dorothy Tripp Snarr 
P.O. Box 444 
Garden City, Utah 84028 
(801)363-4024 
J. Elizabeth Van Fleet 
P.O. Box 2702 
St George, Utah 84771-2702 
(435) 634-9564 
Billie Way 
437 8th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
(801)364-4943 
Beverly Lowe 
1771 South California Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84606 
(801)377-0027 
Melinda Rollins 
4393 South 2500 East 




50 South Main Street, Suite 920 
Salt Lake City, 84144 
1-877-532-3441 
Alan P. Smith 
385 Brahma Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107-6006 
(801) 263-9359 (office) 
(801) 266-0320 (home) 
Transcript Requ, u I Billing Statement / Appellace Court Notification 
Sixth and Seventh Districts 
Please Return this Statement With Payment Amount Due 
Transcript Request Date: Otkfezx lO, 3 o o ^ 
Case Type (L\\)[\ 
Case Name: HaAuVx -vs - ~t*xv i s» 
Case Number: ^ C U c C O l O 
Judge: K U H \ c X ^ 
Hearing Type (s): Wc^~TV icu 
Requested by: ItSudo* U 3 COL\V 
Address: S\\ Sou£¥h S ^ e t S ^ V ^ b O 
Phone & Fax: %CM-SSi « ^ O D p w ^ * . 
Case on Appeal? N 0 ( ^ ^ > 
Clerk: 
Date Transcript is needed ft$ 
^ Mail transcript I will pick it up 
Date(s) of Hearing: Aprxl - 2 , 3 , ^ , 5 c u r J i q , ^ 
Court Location: 
(Circle Qng^Original & 1 COTJJL-





























# of pages 




Appeal cases only: 
Date Acknowledgment Sent 
Date Notice of Filing Sent 
Date Sent: 
Date Sent 
Date Transcript Mailed/ Filed: 
Remit payment to District Court, (list county) 
*CASHIER: Duplicate receipt is to be forward to the Designated Clerk. 
Clerk complete the Information in the Applicable Table on reverse side: 
